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COMIENTS
The Florida Court has in the past recognized that the right to
pursue a lawful business is a valuable property right 2c and has implied that interference with property rights by false statements, acts
of coercion, or threatened injury may be enjoined; 27 yet it has also
indicated that an injunction will lie only when there is a breach
of trust or contract. 28 By the instant decision, however, it has adopted
the doctrinaire view. This result may perhaps be explained by the
fact that the complainant pleaded in terms of injury to personal
rights rather than property rights and by the Court's greater concern
with freedom of speech than with protection of property rights when
the two policies dash. The decision does not necessarily foreclose the
right to injunctive relief in future cases.
There is no one solution that will guarantee the desired result,
for the cases in this area lack uniformity and often seem irreconcilable.2 " Although pleading should not control the case, 30 the possibilities of obtaining injunctive relief will be greatly enhanced by
pleading within the exceptions and methods of avoidance that other
courts have set up rather than in terms of libel and slander, personal
rights, or personal reputation.
JOHN WOOLSLAIR SHEPPARD

INSURANCE- CONSTRUCTION OF EMPLOYEE-EXCLUSION
CLAUSE IN AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY POLICY
National Surety Corp. v. Windham, 74 So.2d 549 (Fla. 1954)
Plaintiff minor was engaged by insured, who was under the influence of alcohol and in need of medical attention, to drive him 200
miles to a sanitorium. The automobile was furnished by insured. During the trip, insured, in a drunken attempt to climb over the seat,
Ala. 1909).
2eState ex rel. Davis v. Rose, 97 Fla. 710, 744, 122 So. 225, 238 (dictum).
-7Paramount Enterprises, Inc. v. Mitchell, 104 Fla. 407, 418, 140 So. 328, 333
(1932) (dictum).
28
Reyes v. Middleton, 36 Fla. 99, 17 So. 937 (1895); Moore v. City Dry Cleaners
& Laundry, Inc., 41 So.2d 865, 873 (Fla. 1949) (dictum).
202 HIGH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INJUNCTIONS §1015 (4th ed. 1905).
3oPound, supra note 6, at 668.
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seized the steering wheel and caused a collision, in which plaintiff was
injured. Judgment was recovered by plaintiff against the insurance
company on insured's automobile liability policy, although the company contended that plaintiff was an employee within the employeeexclusion clause of the policy. On appeal, HELD, plaintiff was an independent contractor and not an employee within the meaning of
the clause. Judgment affirmed, Justices Terrell, Thomas, and Mathews dissenting.
The insured's policy contained the following standard automobile
liability clause:
"This policy does not apply ...

to bodily injury or to sickness,

disease or death of any employee of the insured while engaged
in the employment, other than domestic, of the insured or in
domestic employment if benefits therefor are either payable or
required to be provided under any workmen's compensation
law .... "
One reason for the exclusion of an insured's employees from the
protection of a policy is the strict liability that workmen's compensation laws impose upon employers for injuries arising out of and in
the course of employment., Indemnification of both workmen's compensation payments and common law judgments at the current premium rate would be actuarily unsound. 2 But, since workmen's compensation payments are specifically excluded by another clause of the
standard policy,3 the purpose of the employee-exclusion clause is to
exclude employees not covered by workmen's compensation. Thus
an insured whose car is driven by an employee not entitled to workmen's compensation benefits is left completely unprotected from
liability for the employee's injuries. 4 To avert the hardships that unwary car owners might incur, some courts have restricted the meaning
of employee as used in the exclusion clause. Persons who have been
'See

FLA. SrAr. §440.09 (1) (1953).
'See A Guide to the Automobile Policy, 1949 INs. L.J. 789.
31bid.
4Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Harrill, 106 F. Supp.
332 (W.D.N.C. 1952); Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Owens, 78 So.2d 104 (Fla.
1955); Jewtraw v. Hartford Acc. & Indemnity Co., 280 App. Div. 150, 112 N.Y.S.2d
727 (3d Dep't 1952). Contra, Home Indemnity Co. v. Village of Plymouth, 146
Ohio St. 96, 64 N.E.2d 248 (1945); Narloch v. Church, 2-34 Wis. 155, 290 N.W. 595
(1940).
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held to be covered despite the clause include temporary and incidental
employees,5 gratuitous volunteers, and independent contractors.7
In the instant case the Court excluded the plaintiff from the effects
of the clause by classifying him as an independent contractor. Although the insured exercised some control over the plaintiff, the Court
stated that he did not, in his condition, have that "right of control"
that a master has over his servant.
The distinction between a servant and an independent contractor
emanates from the theory of respondeat superior, under which the
employer is liable for the servant's tortious conduct if committed
within the scope of his employment s but not for that of an independent
contractor. 9 Most workmen's compensation acts exclude independent
contractors from coverage.' 0
Many courts, when faced with cases involving this distinction,
strain the facts to accomplish a particular result. If the court wishes
to hold the insurance company liable despite an employee-exclusion
clause, the injured person will be classed as an independent contractor.
In a similar factual situation, however, the "servant" label may be applied in order that the benefits of the workmen's compensation statutes may be utilized. Although the results of the individual case may
be just, the end result is a hopeless maze of conflicting law."
In the instant case the Court, by disregarding the plaintiff's statement that he understood he would be subject to the insured's orders,
found sufficient control in the plaintiff to justify holding him to be an
independent contractor. This classification was not essential to the
plaintiff's case, because the Court stated further that the employment
was of the casual or incidental type to which the exclusion clause does
not apply. The Court analyzed the facts in a manner that enabled it
to reach a just result. This case, in its disregard for precedential ri-5Cf., Daub v. Maryland Cas. Co., 148 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. Ct. App. 1941), aff'd sub
nom. State ex rel. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Hughes, 349 Mo. 1142, 164 S.W.2d 274

(1942).

Bean v. Gibbens, 175 Kan. 639, 265 P.2d 1023 (1954). But see Clinton Cotton
Oil Co. v. Hartford Acc. & Indemnity Co., 180 S.C. 459, 186 S.E. 399 (1936).
7Sills v. Sorenson, 192 Wash. 318, 73 P.2d 798 (1937); cf. Hardware Mut. Cas.
Co. v. Hilderbrandt, 119 F.2d 291 (10th Cir. 1941).
8REsTATFMi-T, AGoacy §219 (1933).
oId. §220, comment c.
iOE.g., FRA. STAT. §440.0 (2) (1953).
"1E.g., in a factual situation similar to that of the instant case the North Dakota
court held the relationship to be that of master and servant, La Bree v. Dakota
Tractor & Equip. Co., 69 N.D. 561, 288 NA.. 476 (1939).
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